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The eight "socialist" or former socialist countries of Central, East 
ern, and Southern Europe can be divided into two groups of four 
nations: those in which the body politic has made a seemingly firm 
commitment to become a market economy (the German Democratic 
Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland); and those in which 
the body politic has not (or not yet) made such a commitment and still 
believes that some kind of a third way of "market socialism," a system 
that combines central planning and the market, is feasible (Bulgaria, 
Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania). To be sure, Yugoslavia is difficult 
to classify since Slovenia and Croatia have a strong preference to join 
the first group, but the other republics are not willing to go along with 
their choice. The USSR would belong to the second group, although 
there too not all republics see eye-to-eye on this issue.
This essay is about the nature and problems of the transition faced 
by the countries that appear to have made a commitment to become 
full-fledged market economies. (Why their commitment is dubbed 
"apparent" will be explained later.) The next section identifies the three 
main models of successful market economies. It is important for those 
of us in the West who wish to advise policymakers in Central and East 
ern Europe on transition to a market economy, and for policymakers in 
those countries working on transition problems who wish to learn from
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the experiences of successful market economies to recognize that in 
different historical, social, political, cultural, and economic environ 
ments, alternative institutional arrangements and policies can be suc 
cessful. This suggests caution in seeking to duplicate some particular 
feature of another country's economic system.
After focusing on the differences between market economy systems, 
the essay identifies and discusses briefly those system features and 
causal relationships that successful market economies appear to have 
in common. Assuming that the factors identified are the right ones, I 
venture the hypothesis that successful transition programs in Central 
and Eastern Europe will be those that can duplicate just those system 
features and policies that seem to account for the successes among the 
market economy countries, irrespective of the economic, social, cul 
tural, and political differences among them.
Next, I examine the economic legacies inherited by the new govern 
ments in Central and Eastern Europe, following the framework pre 
sented in the previous section. The purpose is to try to identify the 
nature and size of the gap between what is and what should be, a gap 
that transition programs should attempt to close. On each set of issues I 
discuss the main policy options and make recommendations.
The concluding part of the essay offers some thoughts on the strat 
egy of transition, calls attention to the immense intellectual, economic, 
and political difficulties of transition, and speculates about policy 
implications for the United States and the West.
Models of Successful Market Economies
As I see it, there are three main models of successful market econo 
mies: the West European social market economy, the U.S. consumer 
market economy, and the Japanese corporatist market economy. Let 
me describe briefly the main differences among them. 1
Although there are vast differences even among the countries of 
Western Europe, the successful European paradigm is best exemplified 
by the social market economy of Germany. There is an unquestioned
Roadblocks to Changing Economic Systems in Eastern Europe 11
commitment to the predominance of market forces and of private prop 
erty; "social market" simply means a recognition that an unbridled 
market has imperfections and that it is the state's responsibility to rec 
tify them. The state is responsible for sound monetary and fiscal poli 
cies (a task that successive German governments have met in 
particularly exemplary fashion), allowing relatively free foreign com 
petition on the domestic market (with agriculture being the most nota 
ble exception); efficient infrastructure, some attention to the 
environment; adequate health care, education, and the right of just 
about all citizens to decent (which in some cases means subsidized) 
housing; job security for the large majority of the workforce (that has 
parallels with the U.S. Civil Service); and substantial government pro 
grams to help the unemployed and the poor.
The basic idea of a social market economy is making capitalism 
more humane in order to sustain political support for the system, but 
not to interfere with market forces so much as to lose the efficiency 
gains of capitalism. The line between what the private sector provides 
via the interplay of market forces and what the state provides as a mat 
ter of political right is, to some extent, blurred. Germany's economic 
performance (as well as that of the other West European countries) has 
been helped by the willingness of its people to save and to work hard, 
traits that to a degree are culturally determined.
In Germany, as in the other countries of (especially Northern) 
Europe, the social and business infrastructures are excellent, the cities 
are generally more livable than those in the United States, and there 
exists only a relatively small underclass of "have not" persons. But it 
should not be forgotten that these achievements came relatively 
recently, not early in the period of postwar reconstruction and expan 
sion. Behind the success is decades of painful sacrifice, initially includ 
ing high unemployment. Furthermore, Europe's property rights under 
the current system are much less entrepreneurial and adaptive than 
property rights under the U.S. system. The most revealing evidence for 
this is their highly disparate rates of growth in long-term job creation. 
To be sure, Europe's problems are being addressed by the 1992 process
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of economic integration, which borrows some of the best features of 
the American system.
As an aside, note that the difference between a German-type social 
market economy and the "market socialism" ideas in Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union is fundamental. Although there is no precise or 
fully agreed to definition of market socialism, its advocates believe that 
the introduction of limited market forces can help preserve an eco 
nomic system in which the means of production should remain pre 
dominantly nonprivate, the government should play a substantial role 
in directing economic activities, and the distribution of income and 
wealth should be relatively egalitarian. Market socialism often entails 
giving workers a substantial role in management. Advocates of market 
socialism are suspicious, often for ideological reasons, of capitalism 
and of markets; market socialism is their terminal of retreat in the face 
of the proven basic faults of a centrally planned economic system. 2
The U.S. model, termed a consumer market economy, assigns a 
powerful role to the pull and push market forces (and only a minor role 
to the government) to promote economic growth through adaptation. 
The entrepreneurial spirit is vigorous and the mobility of the factors of 
production, including labor, is high. The efficiency of the market is 
praised and government interference is criticized (although reality is 
not as extreme as the image). To be sure, long-run market efficiency is 
probably impaired by the often short-term horizons of corporations, the 
get-rich-quick schemes chased by many entrepreneurs, and by the inor 
dinate amount of litigation and financial manipulation that are also a 
part of the system. Government regulation (and deregulation) typically 
targets as the beneficiary the consumer rather than the producer. Social 
pressures and government policies promote private consumption over 
saving. This preference is reflected not only in individual and corporate 
behavior but sometimes also in irresponsibly large deficits in the gov 
ernment budget.
Critics note that the U.S. paradigm excessively promotes the virtues 
of short-term market efficiency and individual consumption over long- 
term growth, equity, and addressing social problems. There is an 
underprovision of social investment. America's infrastructure has been
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deteriorating. And a large underclass, with no stake in the prevailing 
economic and social order, has emerged and is being perpetuated.
Japan's paradigm, termed a corporatist market economy, is a partic 
ularly successful blend of features rooted in Japan's own environment 
and traditions.3 One of its main features is intense competition for 
greater market shares rather than for short-term profits. This has led to 
long-term thinking and continuous improvements in efficiency, pro 
ductivity, and cost-competitiveness, even though the domestic market 
has been sheltered—often for long periods, until domestic firms in an 
industry have matured fully—from foreign competition. Most Japa 
nese firms have a strong commitment to employment security, but not 
to the preservation of the specific jobs of individual workers. This, in 
turn, has justified large corporate expenditures on retraining programs 
and relocation. Together with Japan's rapid rate of growth and the 
downward flexibility of wages, these features have contributed to its 
enviable record of full employment, flexible market adaptation, and 
spectacular economic success.
Perhaps no factor is more important in the Japanese model than its 
promotion of an extraordinarily high level of voluntary savings and 
investment. These are prompted by the pressures as well as opportuni 
ties of its economic system, by its government's policies (providing 
large incentives to save and a stable financial framework), as well as by 
the traditions of the Japanese culture. There is a close working relation 
ship between the government on the one hand and business and labor 
unions on the other. The bureaucracy has maintained and uses skill 
fully its authority over the private sector, mostly by assisting producers 
rather than consumers or labor.
We should not forget that Japan's spectacular success is of relatively 
recent fruition; in the later 1950s, its level of development was mea 
sured to be on par with those of the USSR and the countries of Eastern 
Europe, on average. Japan has achieved what it has today by sacrific 
ing consumption over a long period; by working extremely hard, 
including the sacrifice of leisure (an attitude that is instilled in early 
childhood); and to some extent also by neglecting a bit its infrastruc-
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ture, the environment, and (until recently) the global burdens shoul 
dered by other large and economically successful nations.
The newly industrialized countries of Asia (e.g., Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, and Singapore) have much in common with Japan's para 
digm, although no two countries have fully identical economic policies 
and systems.
Common Causal Factors 
in Successful Market Economies
Although there are major variations in the economic systems and 
policies among even the successful capitalist market economies, the 
economic systems and policies of such countries appear to have 
shared, to a greater or lesser degree, the following essential features.
1. Private Ownership. The means of production are predominantly 
privately owned. State-owned enterprises, in some cases accounting 
for as much as one-third or more of output, have played a more impor 
tant role during the early stages of reconstruction and development, 
when unemployment was still high and voluntary savings still low, 
than subsequently. State enterprises tend to be more efficient when 
they function in a competitive environment than when they are insu 
lated. In a competitive environment, state ownership does not automat 
ically mean gross inefficiency if the firms receive no subsidies or the 
subsidies are given in ways that do not cancel the pressures and 
rewards of market forces for the firm. However, since the operation of 
state-owned firms is difficult to insulate from political and bureaucratic 
pressures, practically all the industrial countries have implemented 
programs of privatization in recent years.
2. Competition and Trade. The single most important feature of a 
well-functioning market system is strong competition. Countries 
whose domestic markets are large enough to accommodate more than a 
handful of firms in each industry, such as Japan, could afford to be pro 
tectionist and still maintain strong competition. However, countries 
that are small or medium-sized must open up to import competition
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and eventually direct foreign investment. Full competition requires 
sound and predictable rules and regulations in all areas of production 
and trade. It is the government's responsibility to establish and enforce 
them, unless industry or trade associations can do the job as well or 
better.
3. Sound Currency. One of the essential functions of government is 
to provide a sound currency. This means a low rate of inflation and full 
convertibility as soon as practicable. The rate of inflation can be kept 
manageable only with sound monetary and fiscal policies (for which 
there are general guidelines but no precise recipes); the same is also a 
precondition for meaningful convertibility. A low rate of inflation and 
the expectation that inflation will not get out of hand are necessary to 
motivate business firms—as well as households as savers and provid 
ers of labor services—to take the long view and to focus on real eco 
nomic activities instead of devoting their energies to hoarding, 
speculation, and other kinds of manipulation to protect the value of 
their assets. Convertibility is essential to link the domestic economy 
with the world economy; it facilitates the efficient cross-border flow of 
goods, services, and people. No meaningful import competition or 
trade along the lines of comparative advantage is likely to take place 
without the currency being convertible.
4. Savings, Taxation, Financial Intermediation. An adequate-to-high 
level of savings and efficient financial intermediation of the incomes 
saved by households (the most important source) and businesses into 
productive investments are essential common features of sustained 
good economic performance. Efficient investment in physical and 
human capital is the engine of technical progress and productivity 
improvements. In the long run, all countries must rely on domestic sav 
ings to finance an adequate level of domestic investment. Net borrow 
ing from abroad can assist a country only temporarily and only on the 
margin.
Countries that have reached a certain level of development need a 
reasonably sophisticated and competitive banking system. This means 
a system that is largely private, with investors risking their own money 
and seeking profits. Savers and investors must have at their disposal an
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array of attractive financial instruments (e.g., savings accounts, stocks, 
bonds and the like).
The rate of taxation, direct plus indirect, on business profits and per 
sonal incomes must not be prohibitive, that is, it must not be so high as 
to act as a disincentive to putting forth a strong economic effort by 
investors, entrepreneurs, managers, professionals, and workers. There 
is no precise figure on what threshold level of taxation begins to seri 
ously inhibit economic effort; that depends in part on a country's eco 
nomic circumstances and its culture. But a tax burden that is greater 
than 50 percent is certain to be constraining; some believe that the 
threshold rate is considerably lower.
5. Infrastructure and the Environment. A sound infrastructure (e.g., 
a well-functioning system of telecommunications, an adequate net 
work of transportation, good schools, hospitals, and housing) is needed 
both for the sake of business efficiency and as a vital contribution to a 
decent standard of living. In addition, people increasingly want the 
government to help protect the environment. Businesses and people are 
generally willing to pay for these benefits through some combination 
of user charges and taxes.
6. Opportunities for Individual Fulfillment. Human beings want 
opportunities to seek personal fulfillment. This means, first and fore 
most, the political and economic freedom to pursue goals as investors, 
entrepreneurs, farmers, professionals, and wage- and salary-earners. A 
pluralistic and relatively stable political system provides the most sup 
portive political environment; economically, the previous paragraphs 
summarized much of what is needed. In addition, people want a proper 
and well-managed workplace; an equitable system of personal com 
pensation and a reasonably fair distribution of income and wealth; 
some degree of employment security; and a back-up system of mini 
mum income maintenance in case of dismissal, old age, or ill health. 
And since more and more of the simple jobs are being automated 
(except in the poorest countries), both future employability and per 
sonal fulfillment require broad and affordable opportunities for a good 
education, including continuous upgrading of skills and retraining.
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The factors just enumerated are strongly interdependent. For exam 
ple, competition is not likely to be strong and investment efficient if the 
means of production are not predominantly private. The voluntary sav 
ings needed for investment are unlikely to be forthcoming if the cur 
rency is not sound and the taxes are excessive. Foreign competition 
and integration into the world economy are essential; to achieve them, 
a convertible currency is needed. These are just a few examples; the 
list of linkages is extensive.
Legacies of Socialism, Transformation Operations, 
and Recommendations
To judge what it would take to transform the economic systems and 
policies of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into systems 
that would sustain good economic performance, let us look at the eco 
nomic legacies inherited by the new governments, using the preceding 
framework. We also highlight the options and problems of transforma 
tion, and make recommendations.4
Much of what these countries have inherited in the economic realm, 
and also their options for transformation, is similar, but certain differ 
ences will be noted. The German Democratic Republic, of course, 
stands out as the country whose absorption into a unified Germany 
simplifies, first, the intellectual problems of transformation (in terms of 
not having to spend time searching for an appropriate kind of eco 
nomic model) and, second, financing its huge costs, which will ease 
some or much of the pain.
1. Ownership. There are not proven ways to develop efficient and 
fully competitive markets and to motivate producers toward efficiency, 
customer satisfaction, and innovative behavior in economies where 
most of the means of production are state-owned. In Central and East 
ern Europe, state- or worker-owned enterprises and large cooperatives 
that function similarly account for much of production (agriculture in 
Poland and Yugoslavia is an exception) and own an even larger share 
of productive assets. Privatization is, therefore, a cornerstone of the
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transformation. As yet, none of these countries has put in place the full 
complement of laws and policies that set out firmly the scope, the 
speed, and the strategies of privatization.
Privatization faces a number of major constraints.
(i) In Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland earlier reforms have trans 
ferred some of the (not always clearly defined) ownership rights to 
workers or their elected representatives, in the mistaken belief that this 
would improve efficiency. Workers often oppose privatization or object 
to terms of the sale that would be acceptable to a private owner. The 
two main policy options are to continue to allow workers a say in 
privatization or to "renationalize" such enterprises, returning to the 
government all rights of ownership. The latter appears to be the pre 
ferred solution on economic grounds, but it is politically exceedingly 
difficult because it appears to be a step backwards.
(ii) Most businesses will require considerable restructuring before or 
after privatization because they are typically overstaffed, lack modern 
production and marketing expertise, and cannot raise sufficient capital 
in their present state. The arguments for restructuring before privatiza 
tion are that it would be politically more acceptable for the government 
than for private (especially foreign private) owners to do it, and that 
revenues from the sale would be greater. The argument for restructur 
ing after privatization is that the state may not have the political will or 
know-how to do the job. My view is that the approach must be coun 
try-, sector-, and enterprise-specific.
(iii) There is insufficient accumulated domestic private wealth to 
find buyers for more than a small fraction of the enterprises to be priva 
tized. Those who have capital often have acquired it in ways the popu 
lation does not consider legitimate. The main options are (a) to gear the 
scope and speed of privatization to the availability of private domestic 
and foreign capital; (b) to give every citizen a share in every enterprise, 
via holding companies; (c) to finance a portion of the equity acquired 
by nationals of the country with a special line of credit; and (d) to make 
large sales and/or placements to pension funds, mutual funds, local 
governments, insurance companies, nonprofit foundations, and like
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organizations. Each solution has advantages and problems; some com 
bination of (c) and (d) would seem to be the best strategy.
(iv) Many sectors of production and distribution are dominated by 
monopolies or oligopolies. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the 
effects of each privatization on competition.
(v) How should state property offered for sale be valued? One prob 
lem is that costs, prices, and the accounting system are arbitrary; a 
more fundamental one is that private investors are typically willing to 
pay only a price warranted by the firm's existing level of efficiency and 
earnings, while the population, the press, and most local politicians 
would like the investor to pay for future earnings expected after the 
improvements. This is as much a political as an economic debate. 
Many are against privatization, whether because of ideology or envy, 
and they use economic arguments to support their criticism. A further 
problem is that in some of the countries, "sweetheart" deals have been 
consummated between management and buyers through "spontane 
ous" privatization deals. The recommendation of most experts is that 
the only way to assure a fair price is to establish, publicize, and enforce 
fair, competitive, and transparent privatization procedures, and then let 
the market determine value.
(vi) Should foreign investors receive the same, preferential, or 
dispreferential treatment as domestic investors? Most experts agree 
that "national" treatment makes the best economic sense, although 
simultaneous preferential and dispreferential treatments in certain 
areas may be justified, some perhaps on a temporary basis.
(vii) Who should get the proceeds and how should they be used? 
The most basic issue is how much of the purchase price should go to 
the state and how much should be invested in the enterprise itself? If 
all proceeds went to the state, would investors be able to pay also for 
the cost of restructuring? Would that not reduce too much the incentive 
to bid? But if all or most proceeds went to the enterprise purchased, the 
investor would then "buy itself and the state would get little. It seems 
that no generalized solution can be recommended. The government's 
revenues from privatization (outright sale, down payments, and debt 
service) should be used mainly to reduce the government's domestic
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and foreign debt; a modest share should be contributed to a revolving 
fund to provide credits for the start-up and expansion of private busi 
ness ventures.
In sum, privatization faces immense economic and political dilem 
mas. There are many additional and extremely difficult issues we did 
not even touch upon, such as handling of the liabilities of an enterprise 
when only some of its assets are sold, the issues of compensation to 
owners expropriated after the war, and the privatization of land and 
housing. All privatization issues are extremely sensitive politically. 
Most political positions can be justified with economic arguments, 
some more sound than others. It is worth noting that while the privati 
zation experiences of market economies can offer helpful insights, in 
Central and Eastern Europe the process has to take place on a much 
larger scale and in an environment in which much of the capital and 
many of the essential supporting institutions are inadequate or nonex 
istent.
2. Competition and Trade. In the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA) countries, central planning has replaced the mar 
ket as the main mechanism of resource allocation. The markets that 
remained or have emerged, mostly in certain consumer goods and ser 
vices, are functioning inefficiently, especially in the countries where 
central planning is still pervasive. The chief problem is market seg 
mentation. In some countries most goods and services, in other coun 
tries many, are distributed at state-controlled prices and are in short 
supply. Consequently, all kinds of nonprice mechanisms of allocation 
have emerged. Therefore, the markets that do operate typically embody 
large "spillover" effects. This means that the "free" prices on those 
markets are often much higher than would normally be justified 
because the money that cannot be spent on the many goods and ser 
vices that buyers would really have liked to purchase "spills over" into 
demand for those goods and services that happen to be available. Even 
in Hungary and Yugoslavia, where past reforms have made planning 
and the market theoretically coexist and jointly determine resource 
allocation, the new governments have inherited situations in which the
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bureaucratic direction of the economy has remained dominant, even if 
the instruments used are not those of direct central planning.
The quick freeing of the prices of most goods and services is ham 
pered by the high degree of monopolization of the domestic markets, 
because norms of fair competition are not well defined, by the almost 
complete absence of import competition (except in Hungary since 
1989 and Poland since 1990), and the prevailing mechanism of intra- 
CMEA trade.
Creating and maintaining competition requires that the following 
steps be taken, more or less simultaneously.
(i) Adopt a program of deconcentration (coupled, whenever possi 
ble, with privatization) that breaks up those monopolies where techni 
cal and economic considerations allow it and where import 
competition is weak or absent.
(ii) Promote the establishment and growth of small and medium- 
sized enterprises.
(iii) Establish sound competition policies and institutions, based on 
freedom to acquire property, for the business firms to enjoy unre 
stricted entry into and exit from the market, and for labor to freely 
migrate within the country. Adopt transparent norms of unfair competi 
tion, with effective mechanisms for enforcement.
(iv) Create an economic, financial, and legal framework that pro 
motes the development of market forces. Especially important is the 
creation of efficient capital markets.
(v) Announce a program and timetable for reducing most subsidies. 
In the enterprise sector, this should be coupled with imposing greater 
financial discipline on firms and exposing them to domestic and inter 
national competition.
(vi) Reform the system of wage determination. One legacy that is 
highly problematic is that up to one-half of an average wage-earner's 
total compensation has been paid in the form of free or subsidized 
goods and services. If subsidies are to be reduced and real incomes are 
not to decline precipitously, wages and salaries must be adjusted 
upward. This complicates the problem of wage determination (which is 
already troublesome because of the absence of real owners to resist
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unjustified demands for wage increases; their place is taken by bureau 
cratic regulation). When can wages be allowed to be fully market- 
determined and whether and how to create a level playing field of 
wage-setting between state-owned and private firms are two of the 
many difficult strategic issues of transition.
(vii) Change the existing mechanisms of intra-CMEA trade and 
finance because a system in which governments direct enterprises in 
what to export and import is not compatible with a market system, nor 
is the settlement of transactions in transferrable rubles (TR). In June 
1990, the Soviet Union abrogated its network of bilateral agreements 
to settle its transactions in TR and proposed switching to dollars. This 
change will almost certainly be introduced next year. Much more diffi 
cult is delegating trading decisions to enterprises. Given the Soviet 
Union's prevailing system and growing economic crisis, it is not 
inclined to alter the existing arrangements. While in principle it is pos 
sible for an East European government to tell its domestic enterprises 
that they must sink or swim on their own in trading with the Soviets, 
the impact of such a change on the volume and composition of trade 
would be very uncertain. To be sure, the economic crisis in the Soviet 
Union and elsewhere in the CMEA, and the pressures to reorient a sig 
nificant part of intra-CMEA trade to the world market are, in any 
event, causing huge shocks and uncertainties for these economies, irre 
spective of what happens to their system of trading. It is paradoxical 
that while changing the system of trade would add new uncertainties 
and burdens in the short run, such a change is in fact unavoidable if a 
country wants to respond effectively to the crisis in intra-CMEA trade.
(viii) Import liberalization of convertible-currency trade must be the 
centerpiece of programs creating a competitive economy, allowing 
prices to be market-determined, promoting exports, and improving the 
gains from trade. The existing system of mostly implicit quotas and 
other administrative restrictions must be transformed into tariffs and 
exchange rate-based "controls" on imports. Import liberalization will 
be easier in countries like Hungary and Yugoslavia that, over the years, 
have introduced significant reforms in foreign trade by weakening and 
eventually disbanding the state's monopoly of foreign trade and by
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granting foreign trading rights to a growing number of business enti 
ties.
3. Sound Currency. One of the legacies of a socialist system is per 
vasive shortages, which means repressed inflation. Shortage is caused 
by two distinct phenomena. One is the unavailability of goods and ser 
vices in the right quantities or assortment, or at the time or place 
needed, i.e., poor matching of demand and supply at micro levels 
because markets function so poorly. This kind of shortage is largely the 
result of the economic system. In certain countries, especially in Yugo 
slavia and Hungary, the reforms introduced in the 1960s were able to 
reduce shortage but not eliminate it.
The more traditional source of repressed inflation is the result of 
excess money and credit creation cum price controls. The pace of 
money and credit creation is a policy decision that is not linked closely 
to the economic system. In recent years, policymakers in Poland, 
Yugoslavia and the USSR have sinned the most and consequently, by 
1990, have come to face the most difficult dilemmas of what to do. If 
inflation—whether repressed or open—is high, that causes severe dam 
age to the economy for reasons that are too well known to be listed. 
But wringing out inflation is exceedingly difficult, economically as 
well as politically, since it involves some combination of large though 
temporary price increases and restrictive monetary and fiscal policies 
which cause bankruptcies and unemployment.
Poland has implemented a drastic policy of stabilization. The Bal- 
cerowicz program, introduced January 1, 1990, opted for: the rapid 
elimination of the budget deficit through large cuts in subsidies and 
other kinds of spending; a very tight monetary policy, initially involv 
ing large interest rate increases to restrain credit demand and to create 
incentives for saving; the closure of unprofitable enterprises, thereby 
abandoning job security; restricting wage increases to a fraction of the 
rate of inflation; the virtual elimination of all price controls (except 
energy and housing); and introducing resident zloty convertibility.
At the time of writing (July 1990), it is too soon to give a definitive 
assessment of the Balcerowicz program. The economy that the new 
government had inherited was in such a deep crisis that something
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drastic had to be done, so shock therapy was perhaps unavoidable. But 
is obvious (by hindsight as well as foresight) that in Soviet-type econo 
mies, inflation is even more difficult to control than in market econo 
mies, and for several reasons.
(i) Commercial banks in a Soviet-type economy do not respond to 
tight monetary policy the way banks do in a market economy. One leg 
acy of the system is that banks do not, as a rule, push enterprises into 
bankruptcy if their loans are "nonperforming." When the commercial 
banks were established (in most countries during the last few years, by 
separating out a part of the former monobank that performed both cen 
tral and commercial banking functions), they were given an arbitrary 
portfolio of assets (outstanding loans to enterprises) and liabilities 
(enterprise deposits) without sufficient reserves to write off the bad 
loans. And the authorities cannot afford to push into bankruptcy the 
handful of banks that do operate in these countries.
(ii) The alternative, that of the banks foreclosing on enterprises, is 
also not practiced. Given the arbitrary nature of costs and prices and 
the state-imposed supply responsibilities on producers, firms that are 
loss-making or illiquid are not necessarily those that are truly the worst 
performers. Even in countries such as Hungary and Yugoslavia where 
the problem of arbitrary pricing has been improved substantially by 
reforms, many enterprises are in a monopoly or oligopoly situation. 
They claim, perhaps with some justification, that their production is 
essential for supplying the domestic or convertible-currency markets. 
Given the precarious status of these countries' balances of payments, 
the threat that their production will be replaced with imports unless 
they shape up is not credible.
(iii) The way enterprises get around tight monetary policy is "credit 
queuing." When firms cannot obtain direct financing, they sell to each 
other on credit. The second enterprise may be unable to pay as well 
because it is de facto bankrupt or because it has itself given pseudo 
credits to other enterprises, and so on down the line (or "queue"). In a 
market economy, where enterprises have real owners, there are eco 
nomic incentives for a creditor to force a nonpaying debtor into bank 
ruptcy, or for the debtor to voluntarily declare himself bankrupt. In a
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socialist economy, nobody has an economic interest in bankruptcy, or 
cares if unsound business practices further dissipate the value of an 
enterprise's assets.
(iv) The only way around these problems (before real owners are 
found and market institutions are created, which will take time) is for 
the authorities to institute draconian measures and to let the chips fall 
where they may. This is what Balcerowicz has done in Poland. But 
enterprises—not being accustomed to such pressures and not having 
much experience in how to be flexible, cut costs, and find and adapt to 
the requirements of new markets—tend to be paralyzed. In the lingo of 
economists, their supply response is weak. In the meantime, produc 
tion declines precipitously and unemployment jumps.
The problems just enumerated are not just those of Poland and the 
countries that must deal with a large stock of excess money and credit. 
These are problems for all countries during their early stages of transi 
tion to a market economy. They too are finding (or will find) it difficult 
to control the strong inflationary pressures that are generated by:
—reductions of subsidies and the freeing of prices in an economy 
where producers face insufficient competition;
—increases in nominal wages (including the substitution of subsi 
dies by money wages);
—depreciation of the real exchange rate;
—having to finance the terms of trade losses with the USSR as the 
CMEA moves to convertible-currency settlement;
—servicing large foreign debts, which reduces domestic supply; and
—increased inflationary expectations.
Thus, it is easy to say that sound money is needed for an economy to 
perform well, but realize it is very difficult as pressures for substantial 
price inflation increase and are notably difficult to control.
Although the policy dilemmas are somewhat different in countries 
where inflationary pressures are very large versus those where they are 
most moderate, the essential policy question is still whether to try to 
get inflation out of the way quickly by a more or less once-and-for-all 
increase in the price level (bunching together as many as possible of 
the factors that account for inflation), which involves a willingness to
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suffer the political price and run the risk that inflation may get out of 
control altogether, or restrict prices to increase more gradually, which 
makes the process more protracted and the medicine perhaps less 
effective.
In either case, it is essential that no time be lost by the authorities in 
creating or strengthening those monetary, banking, and financial insti 
tutions and instruments that are essential for monetary policy to be 
effective.
Sound money also means a convertible currency. There are many 
different kinds of convertibility: for residents and nonresidents, for the 
enterprise and the household sectors, and for current- versus capital- 
account transactions. Most important, I believe, are (a) that domestic 
enterprises be able to buy the foreign currency to pay for imports; (b) 
that foreign investors be able to convert their local earnings and repa 
triate the capital invested; and (c) that foreign tourists could readily 
obtain the local currency at a single exchange rate and that the inflow 
be channeled (via the authorities or via a foreign exchange market) into 
imports and debt service rather than into the mattresses or foreign bank 
accounts of currency speculators.
Should the exchange rate be fully market-determined by letting it 
float; should the authorities fix the rate and try to maintain it; or should 
they opt for an intermediate solution, such as frequent but small adjust 
ments?
The main advantages of the floating rate are that the authorities need 
not maintain large reserves and that there will be a single exchange rate 
in the economy. Its disadvantage is that under conditions that typically 
prevail in these countries during the early stages of transformation, the 
market will assign an extremely low value to their currencies relative 
to their purchasing power. This makes not only exports but domestic 
assets also very cheap to foreigners. That, in turn, creates or exacer 
bates the political problem of foreign investment and also feeds infla 
tion.
The advantage of a fixed exchange rate (depending on where the 
rate is set) is that it mitigates the above problems. Its disadvantage is
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that fixed rates are not possible to maintain without economic policies 
that support them, and without adequate reserves.
Poland, as part of its program of economic stabilization and liberal 
ization, decided on a very substantial devaluation, eliminating the huge 
difference between the official and grey market rates, and then trying 
to keep the rate fixed. Hungary also has a fixed exchange rate regime, 
periodically adjusted for inflation differentials, but its official rate val 
ues the forint significantly higher than the rate prevailing on the paral 
lel (grey) market, so it has a de facto multiple exchange rate system.
4. Savings, Taxation, Financial Intermediation. One legacy is the 
very large share of the German Democratic Party that is channeled 
through public coffers—60 to 65 percent—which of course has to be 
covered by taxes. Extensive redistribution in the form of transfers and 
subsidies to and from enterprises and households is the main reason 
why the share is so high.
The net voluntary savings of households (the sector that throughout 
the world provides the bulk of savings) is much lower in socialist econ 
omies than in market economies for the following reasons.
—The share of personal income in the total income of the popula 
tion is low because too much is distributed centrally.
—The share of personal income saved is also lower than in compa 
rable market economies because, until now, governments have 
provided full pensions, free education and health care, and job 
security. International studies of what motivates household sav 
ings show that the precautionary motive (the individual's desire 
to weave a personal safety net) is the most important. Therefore, 
one reason that governments in Central and Eastern Europe need 
to substantially reduce their cradle-to-grave systems of support is 
to encourage voluntary savings; another, of course, is that many 
of those programs are dysfunctional and too costly to be afford 
able without imposing prohibitively high individual and business 
taxes.
—In some of the countries the level of household debt is very high 
because automatic entitlements to subsidized loans for housing 
have created the incentive to assume the largest possible moit-
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gages. In Hungary, for example, housing subsidies alone (mostly 
on the interest rate) consume 15 percent of the central budget
—Real (or perceived) interest rates on household savings have been 
negative until recently, in all the countries; it is still the case in 
some of the countries.
—The absence of opportunities to buy stocks, mutual funds, and 
other financial and real assets has reduced the incentive to save 
for investment purposes.
In such systems, much of the economy's large savings is generated 
by way of very high direct and indirect taxes. For example, Hungary 
today has a 53 percent payroll tax (43 percent paid by the employer 
and 10 percent by the employee), a 50 percent marginal income tax 
rate, a 40 percent corporate profits tax, a value-added tax of up to 25 
percent, plus many additional specific excise taxes. The government 
then decides, politically and bureaucratically, how to allocate its large 
revenues. This helps explain why these economies have such notori 
ously low efficiency of investment.
The main objective of fiscal policy during the transition should be to 
reduce significantly the tax burden on producers and households while, 
at the same time, balancing the budget. To encourage capital forma 
tion, retained earnings should be taxed at significantly lower rates than 
distributed earnings, and savings and capital gains should be granted 
preferential tax rates. Other exemptions should be reduced and the tax 
systems restructured to conform to international standards.
There is an urgent need in all these countries to strengthen the finan 
cial system by allowing much greater scope for competing private 
financial intermediaries, including foreign-owned ones. Private finan 
cial intermediaries are essential for improving the efficiency of invest 
ment allocation. There is a role for governmental institutions and 
programs, but they too should be run in a businesslike fashion.
5. Infrastructure and the Environment. Two areas where the all- 
powerful governments of the socialist countries should have outper 
formed their counterparts in market economies are building and main 
taining infrastructure and protecting the environment. How 
paradoxical that especially in these areas all the centrally planned
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economies governments have performed so disgracefully poorly. The 
extent of environmental degradation is immeasurably worse in Eastern 
than in Western Europe. This is explained partly by the priority placed 
on development of mining, metallurgy, the chemical sector, and other 
heavy industries, and partly by simple inattention. Infrastructure has 
also been neglected One reason for the worsening crises in these econ 
omies is that by now they have "used up" much of the infrastructure 
inherited from before the war.
It is urgent that environmental regulations be tightened and enforced 
and that a long-term program of clean-up be adopted and financed, 
partly from external sources. Practical considerations suggest that 
infrastructure should be opened up to foreign investment since the bud 
gets of these countries are simply not in a position to devote the 
resources needed to develop and maintain infrastructure at the desired 
level of efficiency.
6. Individual Fulfillment. It was already mentioned that one of the 
legacies is a cradle-to-grave system of social programs. This seemingly 
attractive public aim has turned out to stifle personal responsibility and 
to generate a large bureaucracy and many regulations, with a great deal 
of corruption and waste. The transformation must begin with a recog 
nition that governments cannot fulfill people's lives through pervasive 
interference, however well-intentioned. Governments' responsibility is 
to create a stable economic and political environment and the confi 
dence-inspiring institutions that permit individuals to fulfill their own 
lives.
Although it is up to each country to adopt the kind of social support 
systems it wants and can pay for, the direction of the needed changes 
includes the following.
—Subsidies for consumer goods and services should be reduced or 
eliminated.
—Housing, which in most countries represents a huge and unsus 
tainable drain on the state budget and causes serious distortions in 
fiscal and monetary policies, needs to be privatized and much of 
it commercially operated. Unsustainable terms of outstanding 
mortgages must be changed.
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—Only a minimum level of pension should be compulsory and 
operated by a government agency; private pension systems 
should supplement it.
—Retirement ages should be adjusted to reflect demographic reali 
ties, the country's labor force needs, and ability to pay the state's 
pension obligations.
—To improve the efficiency of health care delivery, the cost of rou 
tine medical services and related prescription drugs should be 
reimbursed only in part, except for patients with very low 
incomes. Privately operated health care should be allowed to 
compete with socialized health care as an incentive to provide 
high-quality service at affordable prices (more or less the Cana 
dian system).
—The above-recommended changes in programs, together with the 
elimination of job security for all, will require the establishment 
of a new kind of social safety net which should rest on two pil 
lars: unemployment compensation and assistance to the needy.
—The systems of education as well as training must be changed, for 
the sake of better individual fulfillment and also to prepare the 
kind of labor force their economies need today and even more in 
the future. In all these countries, access to higher education is 
much too exclusive and restricted. The proportion of young peo 
ple in secondary and especially in tertiary education is much 
lower than in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development countries and it must be raised. Today's curriculum 
(in education as well as in training) tends to prepare for skills that 
are defined too narrowly and are often obsolete. The curriculum 
must be broadened, putting more emphasis on basic skills, inter 
disciplinary studies, communications, and greater individual 
choice of courses and flexibility of thinking.
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Conclusions and Implications for Western Policy
Transition involves changes in the economic system, strategic eco 
nomic decisions, and economic policy choices.
The most important strategic decision is the sequencing and speed 
of transition. In countries that face an unusually large macroeconomic 
disequilibrium, the highest priority must be given to stabilization. This 
may require what in popular parlance is known as shock treatment. 
Immediate attention must be paid also to introduce those reforms in the 
institutional framework that are needed to make stabilization policies 
effective.
One of the great unknowns is whether it is possible to significantly 
improve economic efficiency as long as most enterprises remain state- 
owned and partly worker-managed. The only option is to try, since 
there is no easy and quick solution to privatization. The key must be to 
design and then hold firmly to a program, with a timetable, that intro 
duces greater competition and eliminates the hope for case-by-case 
state support for the enterprises that are failing.
Concerning the pace of systemic transformation, the place for cau 
tion is at the policy deliberation phase, weighing the alternatives, the 
likelihood of achieving intended and unintended consequences, 
sequencing choices, and modes of implementation. Measures should 
be packaged into large bundles because the economy operates as an 
organic whole and not as an unrelated collection of bits and pieces. 
Packaged into large bundles, the linkages in the system can be relied 
upon to effectively enhance every other action.
Moving rapidly also makes political sense: to prevent a consensus 
that forms immediately after the elections from dissipating before a 
large package of measures is implemented and results become evi 
dent—probably a minimum of two to three years. Any large program, 
such as privatization and foreign economic liberalization, will take 
years to implement, even at maximum speed.
Agreements with the international and regional organizations, such 
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Group of 24, and the 
European Community, can help a government sell a tough program
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domestically by holding out the promise of such economic benefits 
linked to program implementation as, for example, some type of asso 
ciation with the European Community. International agreements can 
also enhance the government's credibility that its program will be 
implemented.
Credibility also means not raising unrealistic expectations. If gov 
ernment policies lack credibility, are hesitant, are full of unworkable 
compromises, then managers and individuals will refuse to change 
their behavior to fit the new policies. This, itself, can undermine trans 
formation. For certain countries, such actions also undermine interna 
tional creditworthiness.
Tremendous obstacles stand in the way of governments following 
the suggestions outlined in this essay. In some countries, the first prob 
lem is that of insufficient credible and mobilizable expertise to design 
good programs. Even in countries where the requisite expertise can be 
found (e.g., in Hungary), there is this question: will the experts—many 
of whom have cooperated with the previous and rather liberal Commu 
nist governments and/or are associated with one of the opposition par 
ties that is not a member of the governing coalition—be listened to by 
the authorities or be pushed aside as "politically unreliable"? There are 
signs that this is happening, which is a great pity. None of these coun 
tries has a second set of first-rate experts waiting in the wings, as there 
are in the industrial countries.
The most fundamental constraints are political. Throughout the 
region, the population has high expectations that changing the political 
system will bring about quick economic improvements. Democratic 
elections, with new and old parties competing for power, tend to rein 
force these expectations with promises that are unrealistic. In some 
cases the promises are made because politicians do not understand the 
situation, in others out of sheer demagoguery. To make matters even 
more difficult, there are many politically influential persons who still 
believe in their heart of hearts that some kind of a third road is a viable 
option and behind the scenes are pushing the policymakers to take it. 
Not infrequently, such persons hide behind market economy slogans.
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Newly elected politicians in all these Central and Eastern European 
countries face an extremely difficult and unpleasant situation. They 
have inherited the sorry legacies of the previous regime. These legacies 
require the new governments to take a series of tough actions. Most 
have unpleasant consequences for the economic well-being of the pop 
ulation, and thus for political stability in the short run. Hie fruits of 
those actions will ripen only years later, perhaps after the next, or after 
the next-to-the-next, election. It is realistic to expect that wise states 
men are (or will soon be) governing these countries? This essay began 
with a statement that the body politic in four of the countries has made 
a seemingly firm commitment to become a market economy. Yes, they 
genuinely want to become like the social market economies of Western 
Europe. But this does not mean that they are also willing to take the 
tough steps that will lead there.
I have only a single thought concerning Western policy toward these 
countries. We should give them substantial economic help, but tie our 
assistance to tough and internationally well-coordinated conditionality. 
Some energy should be devoted to public education that explains the 
requirements and pitfalls of transformation and the rationale of condi 
tionality. Although the United States does not have much money to 
offer, it should rely on its intellectual and political leadership to direct 
a Western consensus on these issues.
Governments in Central and Eastern Europe should be expected and 
nudged to make the tough economic changes that experts agree are 
needed. Otherwise they will not and should not last long, and western 
assistance will have been wasted.
NOTES
1. The distinction among the three models derives from my discussions with and the writings 
of the distinguished Canadian economist, Sylvia Ostry. See, for example, her Governments and 
Corporations in a Shrinking World: Trade and Innovation Policies in the United States, Europe, 
and Japan (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1990) and her co-authored article in the 
May 1982 issue of the OECD Observer.
2. The idea of market socialism was first put forward in the 1930s by theoreticians in the West, 
such as Lange and Taylor, largely in response to the Great Depression. Next, it was revived in a
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rather special form in Yugoslavia (socialist self-management) in the early 1950s as an alternative 
to the Stalinist model. Then it was resurrected in the 1960s by reform economists in Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Perhaps the fullest expression of market socialism was the 
blueprint of Hungary's New Economic Mechanism, much of it introduced in 1968. Until the late 
1980s, reform economists in all the Communist countries were politically constrained from 
advocating any system change more radical than market socialism. Today, as the political 
constraints have lifted in many of the former Communist countries and as negative experiences 
with models of market socialism accumulate, a growing number of specialists, including the 
author of this essay, have doubts that market socialism is a viable economic system. In some 
cases, market socialism refers to the temporary economic system that will be in place during the 
period of transition to a genuine market economy, when state-owned enterprises will still be 
dominant and the government will have to play a central and pervasive role in managing the 
transition.
3. For further details, see Masaru Yoshitomi, "Micro- and Macro-Foundations of Japan's 
Economic Success," in Andras Koves and Paul Marer (eds.), Foreign Economic Liberalization of 
Hungary and the CMEA and International Experiences (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
forthcoming). I have also benefited from discussions with Seiichi Masuyama of the Nomura 
Research Institute (London) about Japan's economic system.
4. From here on, this essay relies extensively on the findings and recommendations presented 
in Hungary in Transformation to Freedom and Prosperity: Economic Program Proposals of the 
Joint Hungarian-International Blue Ribbon Commission (Indianapolis and Budapest: Hudson 
Institute, 1990).
